T HE MISSION of the Church is at the center of much contemporary theology. 1 One basic theological issue is the relation between the Church's mission and its religious identity. How does any activity or ministry relate to the Church's religious identity? Unless its ministry expresses this identity, the Church fails to be church. The recent loss of membership within American churches has been attributed to their focusing on social issues rather than on their religious message.
distinct. The other tradition, Lutheranism, appealed to the distinction between the gospel and the law. Whereas the gospel referred to individual grace, personal conversion, and private faith, the law related to the institutional, social, and political. The two realms were clearly distinguished and no ambiguity remained about the Church's proper religious mission. Both traditions, however, minimized how God's grace is operative in social and political life and how the gospel should penetrate the institutional. Moreover, recent historical studies have clearly demonstrated that the relation between nature and grace for Thomas, and gospel and law for Luther, were more intricately connected than their separation in modern social and political thought.
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Substitutive Mission
In reaction to this view, theologians have sought to work out a more positive relation with the category of substitution. Wolf hart Pannenberg maintains that the Church's mission is concerned with the impact of God's kingdom upon all dimensions of human life. But he adds the specific reservation that the "specifically social activities of the church (its welfare organizations, child care centers, nursing and hospital establishments, schools etc.) are subsidiary and temporary. The church engages in these activities as a substitute for the political structure of society." 12 This notion of substitutive service has been developed by Richard P. McBrien and Juan Luís Segundo. McBrien argues that "only when there is a lack of personnel or institutions to handle imperative needs" and "only where it is clearly a matter of supplying for the déficiences of other responsible agencies" can formal institutional social action be justified. 13 Those who attribute a permanent proper social mission to the Church are "theologically conservative" and "argue reductively," for "they are the ones who see no need at all to justify the existence, for example, of Catholic schools, hospitals, counseling agencies, and the like." 14 The Church does have a social mission, but it should formally and institution ally so engage itself only where secular agencies do not.
This proposal appears reasonable at first. If, for example, in a previous century a missionary might have organized sanitation for a village to prevent disease, the Church's mission is not the sanitation business. Moreover, the Church should avoid "patronizing" the world and should allow for the autonomy of human social organization. Where secular authorities do not perform such services, only then can the Church's social involvement be interpreted as the spelling out of the impact of God's kingdom upon all dimensions of life.
Yet a substitutional theory goes against a Roman Catholic tradition. Catholics did not establish universities and schools only as substitutive institutions until the state could take them over. They never doubted that schools and hospitals were integral to the Church's mission. More over, if taken to its ultimate consequences, a substitutional theory would result in the Church's removal from welfare activities, hospitals, hospices, and educational institutions, would limit it to liturgical celebration, proclamation, catechesis. Some have concluded that the Church should not run hospitals but have chaplaincies within hospitals, should not run schools but stress catechetical instruction-legitimate deductions from a substitutional theory.
Several questions emerge. Does not a substitutional theory clearly split religious and secular tasks, so that a social mission is improper and inauthentic save for exceptional cases? Does it not propose the same dichotomy as the first position? Intuitively, do not the case of sanitation and that of schools or hospitals differ? Why have objections to schools and hospitals arisen only in recent times? Do these examples tell us something about the interrelation between religious and social tasks? An adequate theology of the relation between religious identity and social mission would have to answer these questions.
Unofficial Mission
A third proposal tries to overcome the dichotomy between religious and social mission by arguing for an unofficial social mission. Karl Rahner has maintained that "the church as an official church, however, is not the immediate or the proper subject for realizing the concrete humani-zation of the world." 15 Not only does the official Church lack the qualifications to do so, but the world has the right to exercise its own responsibility for its development. To make the humanization of the world the Church's proper task would be to reintroduce clericalism and integralism.
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Rahner suggests an alternative: the Church can inspire, motivate, and move groups of Christians within it. They can organize in the service of the world. Their service can be inspired by Christian motives. Rahner's proposal articulates much of the theology at the basis of the Catholic Action movement in Europe. Inspired by the hierarchy, laypersons became explicitly engaged in a social mission (a direct political mission was often forbidden). They gradually gained autonomy and their leadership flowed over to the Christian democratic parties. 17 In the United States, unofficial lay involvement in a social mission is advocated in order to incorporate into the Catholic Church the American voluntarism exemplified by townhouse democracy and religious Congregationalism. 
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Liberation theology also develops the implications of eschatology for Christology, ecclesiology, spirituality, and theological methodology. 31 However, it stresses the unity of salvation history and world history and thereby links eschatology and liberation. The Church not only uses eschatology as a source of critique but also strives for authentic antici pations and incomplete realizations within history of the eschatological reality.
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Since liberation theology links eschatology and human liberation, itmore so than political theology-has posed the challenge, how the Church's religious identity is related to its social and political mission. This is the neuralgic point of controversy between the defenders and critics of liberation theology. 33 To its critics, liberation theology is reductionistic: it has reduced the Christian message to social reform; it has turned the Church into a political group. To its defenders, liberation has shown how the full meaning of the gospel relates to social and political life.
The Challenge of Magisterial Statements
The magisterium has a long tradition of social teaching. Since Vatican religious identity and its social and political mission. The development after Vatican II has been described as zigzagging and even as backsliding. I do not agree. It seems to me that the magisterium is seeking to hold fast to two elements, the religious identity and the social-political mission, without reducing one to the other. It nuances the traditional contrast between evangelization and civilization and between religious purpose and social mission. At the same time, it challenges theologians to reflect more deeply on the Church's religious identity and its relation to a social and political mission.
The specific task, not identified nor contrasted with human development. Instead the Pope challenges the Synod to work out the relation between evangelization and development. The Synod itself produced two documents. The first, On Human Rights and Reconciliation, affirmed that "the promotion of human rights is required by the gospel and is central to her ministry." 38 The second, Evangelization of the Modern World, not only asserts "the intimate connection between evangelization and liberation/' but it explains that the "Church, in more faithfully fulfilling the work of evangelization, will announce the total salvation of humans or rather their complete liberation, and from now on will start to bring this about." 39 Furthermore, it explains that evangelization is interrelated with liberation, but salvation is more than the present liberation that it now begins to bring about. Such an approach is dialectical.
A similar dialectic appears in the statements of Paul VI and John Paul II. In his closing address to the 1974 Synod, Pope Paul VI draws up a balance sheet of the work done. Moreover, further study should show how human liberation is to be emphasized without overemphasis to the detriment of the essential meaning of evangelization. 40 His own document Evangelization in the Modern World both links and distinguishes evangelization and human liberation. They are linked in two basic ways. First, the gospel is not complete unless it interrelates the gospel with social human life. Second, specific bonds exist on the level of anthropology, theology, and the gospel. Anthropology: the human subject of evangelization is a concrete person living in social and political structures. Theology: redemption affects creation; to restore justice requires the combatting of injustice. Gospel: to proclaim love for humans includes proclaiming justice and peace for them.
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Paul VI also carefully distinguishes. Evangelization is not identical with human liberation, because some forms of liberation are not consistent with the gospel and because evangelization entails more than liberation. This "more" is developed in two ways. It is more encompassing insofar as the establishment of God's kingdom is much more universal 38 Ibid. 50-51. The text argues that the relation between evangelization and social ministry is based upon human rights. Social ministry is "required" and is "central" to the Church's ministry. 39 Ibid. 52-57, at 55. The document refers to "mutual relationship" and "intimate connection between evangelization and liberation." The Gospel contains "profound reasons" and "new incentives for a social ministry that should eliminate the unjust social and political structures flowing from sin." 40 than any improved social or political order. It is much more profound insofar as it reaches the personal depths of humans and strikes at sin, the root of social and political injustice within human nature. 42 In Paul VFs dialectical view, the gospel is incomplete without liberation, just as liberation is incomplete without the gospel. When the Pope emphasizes the primacy of evangelization, he is pointing to an evangelization that includes liberation, transforms liberation, and is more than liberation. He does not retract the thesis that justice is a constitutive element of evangelization; he explains the profound interrelation between them.
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A different vision but similar dialectic is present in John Paul II's address to the Third General Assembly of Latin American bishops at Puebla and his encyclical letters Redemptor hominis to Laborera exercens, 44 even though his position on the relation between the Church's religious identity and its social mission is not always easy to interpret. He affirms that "evangelization is the essential mission, the distinctive vocation, and the deepest identity of the Church," at the same time that he quotes the Synod's affirmation that action for justice is a constitutive dimension of the Church's mission. 45 When he declares that the Church's mission is "religious and not social or political," he affirms in the very same sentence that the religious mission must touch upon all the dimensions of concrete human life. 46 Such dialectical affirmations make possible to classify him under the first (improper) as well as the third (unofficial) and fourth (partial but secondary) options described above.
Some have noted differences between John Paul II and his predecessors. For example, Joachim Giers argues that he does not develop Mater et magistra's correlation between economic and social progress but warns against overpowering economic progress. Moreover, he does not pick up the 1971 Synod's reference to the relation between the kingdom and earthly progress. 47 But these criticisms rest on a partial selection of his writings. Laborem exercens, for example, does relate human work not only to earthly progress but also to the development of the kingdom. Spes decade." 57 And further; for to relate religious identity and socialpolitical mission is not merely to search for a religious justification of the Church's involvement in social justice, but also to search for the very meaning of the Church.
This issue was well put by Paul Tillich. He observed that the Church has in fact contributed much to Western civilization. It has advanced culture, furthered peace, promoted social justice. Each benefit can be countered with a deficit. But both pros and cons would miss the point, "for a church that is nothing more than a benevolent socially useful group can be replaced by other groups not claiming to be churches: such a church has no justification for its existence." 58 The Church is more than a lobbying group, more than an agent of social welfare. It has a distinctive religious identity, and if it is to be church, its religious identity must come to the fore in its style of commitment to social justice and in its commitment to human liberation.
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: HERMENEUTICAL REFLECTIONS
To explore this issue, I shall (1) discuss various methodological issues involved in specifying the Church's religious identity, then (2) approach the issue not from eschatology as in political or liberation theology, nor from anthropology as in the magisterial statements, but from the nature of religion itself and specifically Christianity as a particular historical religion.
Inadequacy of Specific Difference
That the Church has a religious identity and a religious purpose is obvious. But what is religious? What is distinctively religious? These questions have been at the center of modern theology. In the nineteenth century Schleiermacher protested against the reduction of religion to metaphysics or morality, whereas in our century Barth has polemicized against RitschTs reduction of faith to social praxis. 59 A constant concern of theology and religious studies has been "to describe certain basic factors which characterize a religious as distinct from a moral, an aesthetic, a scientific, or a political perspective." 60 However, the use of "limit" when combined with the methodological approach of the search for the specific difference can be misleading. The search for the essence or distinctive purpose often defines that purpose in terms of a "specific difference." Yet a definition from the standpoint of specific difference often posits a partial element as the total meaning, and so fails to describe adequately a reality's meaning or identity. If Catholicism or Protestantism were defined primarily in terms of their specific differences, the number of sacraments or belief in the papacy would be the essential point as the specific difference; the common commitment to Christ would be overlooked. Or if Christianity were defined in its specific difference to other religions, the love of God would be secondary because other religions preach the love of God. If, taking Aristotle's definition of human person as rational animal, one were to describe human identity by the specific difference between humans and animals, then the focus would be on rationality alone. But if human nature is viewed exclusively or primarily as rationality, the meaning of human identity is distorted.
Similarly, if religious identity is defined precisely in its specific difference from the ethical, social, or political, the religious is distorted. As human nature is not a pure but an incarnate rationality, so religiosity manifests itself within the ethical, social, and political. If the religious is viewed in its specific difference from the ethical, social, and political, what is religious will cease to be a dimension of life. If the mission of the Church is defined precisely and exclusively in its specific difference from other groups, what is shared in common is overlooked. It could be stated that love of neighbor is only accidental to Christianity because other groups preach love. The Church's religious mission should be seen in the way its specificity comes to the fore precisely in its interrelation with other dimensions of human life. My methodic suggestion goes against some strains of contemporary theology, especially Protestant neo-orthodoxy that has been influenced by Kierkegaard's distinction of the religious from the aesthetic and ethical, a distinction that views the religious as but in one case religion affirms it, in another religion relativizes it. 65 In medieval times caring for the sick and poor was viewed as an act of charity and religion. Responding to the objection that almsgiving was not an act of charity but of religion, Aquinas argued that it could be considered both. He referred to the crisscrossing of virtues and the interrelating of formal and material aspects.
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This crisscrossing takes place on a much more basic level than motivation, context, and direction. It also takes place historically within the religious tradition. A meal can be secular or sacred. Washing can be a secular action or a sacrament. How the action is understood today depends upon how the religious tradition has incorporated several actions within its religious symbol systems and how it views the action in relation to God's transcendent presence within history. Individuals today stand within a religious history that determines how certain actions are understood. An action is therefore understood as religious not simply by a specific difference but by a complex of motivation and purpose, context and meaning, religious history and tradition. All come together to constitute the religious identity of human activity. : as a friend, a teacher, a professional. The subject acting is one person, but there is a plurality of possible self-identifications, one of which is made in carrying out the particular activity. Likewise, the action itself can be represented in a specific way. Although it might be quite simply described, it is, at the same time open to more horizons of interpretation and understanding than are explicitly exhibited. In every action, therefore, there is not only a specific self-referential identification, but also a specific representation by which the act is understood in a specific way.
This analysis helps us understand the religious dimension in a variety of ways. Quite often it is claimed that the difference between social help as a secular or religious act lies in the motivation. Quite often religious actions are identified through some specific manifest characteristic. The phenomenological description above indicates that human actions are much more complex than motivation or what is manifest. I think an analogy can be drawn between appresentation and the perception of the religious identity of actions.
69 Just as we do not immediately and directly intuit the ego of another, but grasp the presence of the other through an association of concordant and similar behavior and through a grasp of all that is copresent in action, so we grasp acts to be religious to the extent that they are concordant with what we understand to be religion and to the extent that we grasp religious elements to be copresent in an action even though these are not directly ostensible. the nature of religion. Unfortunately, definitions of religion are notoriously controversial. 70 Indequate are substantial definitions that identify religion solely with particular beliefs, since religion is much more than the affirmation of a certain belief. 71 Equally inadequate is a definition of religion without any reference to beliefs. 72 Likewise, an experiential definition, as Rudolf Otto's definition of religion as the experience of the numinous or mysterious, is inadequate because it fails to cover the wide range of religions and to encompass all that is entailed within religion. 73 Although many today combine a functional and an interpretative analysis of religion, it is important to bring the historical dimension to the fore. A functional theory explains religion through its function of integrating society: religion is the glue that bonds society. Religious beliefs, basic values, and civil religion can exemplify this function. Historical religions, however, have not merely integrated societies but challenged them. 74 An interpretative theory explains how religion provides a set of symbols that establish moods and motivations by formulating conceptions of a general interpretation of existence. 75 Such a definition appears too broad. Is any general interpretation of reality thereby religious? For these reasons it is important to combine a functional and interpretative approach with reference to the articulation of meaning within historical religions.
Since only concrete historical religions exist, the function and meaning of a religion should be determined not by excluding but by taking into account the historical self-reflection and praxis of the religion itself-for us, the Christian religion. 76 An adequate methodological approach, there-fore, should not define it exclusively as a specific difference in isolation from other dimensions of life; it should investigate how what is religious comes to the fore in a complex series of overlappings that determine a person's self-identification and interpretation of reality within the history of a religious tradition. Likewise, to describe the function and meaning of religion from the starting point of a historical religion is to show the impact of particular religious beliefs upon a particular historical community, its self-understanding and its interpretation of reality. To illustrate the meaning and function of Christian religious identity, two particular beliefs will be examined in relation to the issue of religious identity and social mission. First, the belief in a transcendent God correlates with the emergence of human personhood. A phenomenology of religion shows that the category of personhood originates with the religious experience of transcendence. Although the inviolable dignity of humans is often viewed as a humanist heritage or a moral imperative independent of religion, its roots lie historically within religious experience. The inviolability of persons is neither empirically demonstrable nor factually necessary. Individuals can be treated as objects and things. Relying upon the phenomenology of religion, Pannenberg argues that the experience of the ultimacy or nonmanipulatableness of power that makes a concrete claim upon humans is the basis of the human personification of reality and of the human self. Therefore "the concept of the personal is originally based on a religiously determined experience of reality, or of the powers governing it."
77 From a different perspective, Karl Rahner's transcendental analysis also shows how the experience of transcendence entails for humans the experience of themselves as persons.
78
This correlation between the religious experience of transcendence and the awareness of self as a person illustrates our above-mentioned methodological principle that the interpretation of reality and self-identification go hand in hand. 79 The belief in God and the belief in the self as a unique, irreplaceable individual are not only correlative beliefs; they have a common historical root within the experience of reality as religious. Although many attempt today to establish the dignity of the human person not on a religious but on a humanistic or ethical basis, the historical religious roots of this dignity should not be forgotten. In regard to human dignity, religious beliefs and nonreligious attitudes crisscross. The religious belief in God as the ultimate power of the universe does not negate human personhood, as is claimed in a humanistic critique of religion, but radically affirms this personhood and historically grounds its emergence.
Therefore to proclaim the belief in a personal God is not the same as teaching that Dione is a moon of Saturn. Instead, the proclamation of God entails a vision of reality, and this vision has a function, for it determines how human and social life is understood and often structured. 80 The religious belief that a personal power grounds all power and force within the universe not only grounds the transcendence of the human person in the face of nature, but also over and against society. AU societal and political organization of power should therefore be so structured that it mirrors the personal ground of the universe and safeguards the transcendence of the individual person.
Second developed trajectory in the postbiblical period. Although susceptible to isolation in schools, it was linked with strains of Stoic thought and with the universalism of the Logos speculation. Nicaea defined Christ to be more than an intermediary wisdom figure, power, or demiurge; he is consubstantial with the ultimate Power and Wisdom of the universe. This decision was a "dehellenization" because it went against the Hellenistic dualism between the world and the transcendent God. 83 The identification of Jesus as Logos and Wisdom with the ultimate power of the universe was important because it bridged creation and redemption. In the Old Testament, Wisdom is the personification of God and of God's activity in the world. God's creation has a purpose. Proverbial wisdom saw the world of appearances as pervaded with divine order that made human existence meaningftil. 84 In Stoic thought, wisdom and logos pervaded all of creation; truth, righteousness, and justice were the incorporations of universal wisdom. 85 It is because this Christology bridged creation and redemption that the development of this Christological trajectory in the postbiblical period went hand in hand with the development of a social mission of the Church based on a theology of creation.
Here lies the profundity of the Christian vision. If the Church has as its task to evangelize and to proclaim Christ, then it proclaims that Christ "reveals the character of the power behind the world." 86 For this reason, in distinction to Metz, I have developed elsewhere a political theology with a bipolar rather than a merely critical function. 92 The first task of a political theology or of a political ministry would be to uncover the latent values and symbols that undergird a particular society. These values and symbols must be confronted with the Christian vision, but such a confrontation cannot simply be that of crisis or judgment. On the one hand, insofar as a political society tends to absolutize particular national beliefs, values, and symbols into a political religion, it can absolutize itself and place itself in opposition to the Christian eschatological vision. On the other hand, insofar as particular beliefs and values of a society can serve as standards by which the de facto praxis of a society or nation is fostered or criticized, they provide significant cultural resources for the Church in its commitment to charity and justice as these intersect with the Christian vision. Such a political theology should be at the center of the Church's political ministry. The Church is acting properly as church when its proclamation confronts the operative values and visions of a society. The danger for the Church's political ministry is not that it will be too confrontative; the danger is that, as a member of society, the Church itself might lose sight of the applicability of its very own vision. Hence the need for a self-reflective and reconstructive political theology.
The Political Praxis of Social Ministry
Second, the Church's religious identity entails a political ministry because of the development of this religious identity and the parallel development of the interrelation between the Church's social ministry and the political structures of society. An adequate theological methodology should take into account this parallel development and intertwinement. Catholic Christology proceeds by reconstructing how the impact of Jesus was successively interpreted by the Church throughout the centuries in order to relate this understanding to the contemporary situation. In Christology, not just its very first stages or the historical reconstruction of the preaching of Jesus but the full conciliar development of a Wisdom and Logos Christology became normative for Christianity. Likewise, the fiiU growth and development of social ministry that went parallel to the Christological development, and not just the first or initial endeavors, should be taken as normative for an adequate understanding of social ministry.
From the very beginning the care of the needy and of the poor was central to Christianity. 93 The oblations collected at Eucharistie celebrations were distributed to the poor under the organized supervision of the bishop. Yet the history of Christianity shows that at those points of time where society became so structured that it took over much of this social activity, the Church's social ministry increasingly became a political ministry insofar as the Church became concerned as to how the state fulfilled the social ministry. This interaction is present in the fourth century, the Middle Ages, and modern times. This development indicates how the social ministry entailed a political ministry. For example, the economic crisis of the third century and Diocletian's tax policies led to the impoverishment of broad groups. Constantine, consequently, integrated the Church's care for the poor within the imperial system. This increased episcopal responsibilities for the poor and helpless. Bishops are increasingly described as patrons of the poor and helpless, but they do not limit their roles to patronage of the poor. They engage in political criticism; they criticize the effects of the Empire's tax policies on the poor-see, for example, Basil's Epistle 110 and Theodoret's Epistle 23.
M A similar intertwinement between social ministry and political organization took place in medieval times. Although at the turn of our century the medieval Catholic practice of almsgiving was criticized as individualistic, arbitrary, and nonsystemic, 95 this criticism overlooked, as Catholic scholars have shown, the intertwinement between the Catholic Church and the cities. From the twelfth century onward, the cities passed legislation to provide for the needy and established hospitals for the poor, the sick, and abandoned children. 96 Church leadership and even theological faculties often praised or criticized political legislation when it concerned matters of social justice. 97 Moreover, the social legislation of the modern state was not in contrast to, but a further development of, the civic responsibilities in the social area. 98 In this same tradition the Council of Trent urged bishops ex officio to supervise the social practices of various cities and provinces. Diocesan and provincial synods were given the task of watching over local economic, civic, and political legislation. 99 These synods emphasized the
